relevant with moves to liquid modernity (Bauman, 1999) , network society (Munro, 2000) , and new forms of technology and technobodies (Best & Kellner, 2001) . Instead, we argue that Foucault's work has an abiding importance and can become even more relevant to the study of ICTs.
The article assumes a degree of familiarity with Foucault's main work but not with its application to ICTs. Before we begin, it is important to stress the provisionality of Foucault's ideas and the fact that Foucault himself was far from being a systematic thinker. He quite deliberately described his practices as "analytical work" rather than theory and his analysis of power relations as "not a theory, but rather a way of theorizing practice" (Kritzmann, 1988, p. 15) . Somewhere, Foucault refers to Nietzche's observation that although thinkers are always shooting arrows into the air, the key thing is for others to pick them up and shoot them in another direction. If the unfinished, open-ended character of his work creates some difficulties for its reception and use, then it also leaves open the possibility of creative applications of his ideas. We must recognize throughout that Foucault himself would expect from others a development, not mere replication of his work.
Foucault: Techne and Technology
Foucault himself wrote little directly about ICT and indeed little about technological artefacts and tools, though he recognized that the technologies he was interested in were physical in part, for example, the architecture of prisons, schools, the clinic. However, he did write much about procedures, techniques, processes, and behavioral or disciplinary technologies, for example, the confession, the examination, prison rehabilitation regimes, and "technologies of the self." This may well have led to his relative neglect among ICT researchers, though a similar omission does not seem to have done any harm to the reception of the work of Giddens and Habermas, for example (Mingers & Willcocks, 2004) . Part of this may well be that Foucault comes less packaged, with less schemas that are easy to adopt. That said, some of his work, especially the image of the panopticon, has been translated directly into, for example, studies of surveillance technologies (Lyon, 1994 (Lyon, , 2003 , of the use of information and databases (Poster, 1990) , and of discipline, information use, and technologies at work (F. Webster, 2005; Zuboff, 1988) .
However, Foucault's contribution can be much richer than this. For example, Foucault was well aware, not least from his reading of Heidegger, of the long-term "greatest danger" (Heidegger's phrase) from technology and from Weberian rationalization (though Foucault, 1983 , prefers to investigate "specific rationalities") and the disciplining and normalization inherent in biopower. Had he lived into the so-called information age, he might well have made the connections between these and the key roles of media-, military-, and work-based ICTs forming this present danger, arising, in Heidegger's (1977) "essence of technology" and in Virilio's (2002) view, as technocratic thinking and imagination become social imagination itself. A Foucauldian perspective leads to a key question here:
How can the growth of capabilities be disconnected from the intensification of power relations? (Foucault, 1984, p. 48) From the early 1970's, the word technology is increasingly to be found in Foucault's writings. The word is usually used in phrases such as "technologies of power," "political technology of the body," "disciplinary technologies," and "technologies of the self." Foucault often elides the word technology with those of techne and also technique, but power always resides in his concept of technology whether referring to behavioral technologies or to technology as architectures, buildings, physical artefacts, and how space is defined and used. Foucault rarely seeks to define his use of the word technology. In an interview called Space, Knowledge, and Power, while discussing the study of architecture, Foucault (1984) offers, somewhat elliptically, the following:
What interests me more is to focus on what the Greeks called techne, that is to say, a practical rationality governed by a conscious goal . . . . The disadvantage of this word techne, I realize is its relation to the word "technology" which has a very specific meaning . . . . One thinks of hard technology, the technology of wood, of fire, of electricity. Whereas government is also a function of technology: the government of individuals, the government of souls, the government of the self by the self, the government of families, the government of children and so on. (p. 295) An interesting contrast can be made with Heidegger, who was interested in the products and tools of the natural sciences and focused on "the essence of technology," or what Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) calls technicity, that is, the new technocratic thinking and style of practices that have emerged, distinguished from the technological devices these practices produce and sustain. For Foucault, too, to judge technology by its tools and its production is to miss the point. In his later work, however, he is looking at modern human sciences, the practices and power relations by which they are founded, and the knowledge and behavioral technologies they produce, and these operate, allied to structures, designed space, and use of tools and artefacts. Moreover the operation of these new methods (technologies?) of power "is not ensured by right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control" (Foucault, 1976 (Foucault, /1978 .
Furthermore, these technologies of power function anonymously-they are implemented by everyone and no one, and autonomously-for, as Foucault once commented in an interview: "While people know what they do, and may know why they do what they do, they do not know what what they do does" (Foucault, 1983, p. 219) . Given this distinctive, historically recent blending of knowledges, disciplinary technologies, and biopower, power/knowledge emerges as the key concept in Foucault's philosophy of modern technology. However, this philosophy of technology is particularistic. Unlike Heidegger, he does not attempt a general account of the essence of modern technology but rather reveals specific histories of technological practices overlooked in other accounts of modern forms of power.
Several points occur here. First, it is important to stress that Foucault does not deny that technologies of power/knowledge can have beneficial features: "My point is not that everything is bad, but everything is dangerous . . . if everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do" (Foucault, 1983, p. 224) . Second, especially in his later work, Foucault indicates that modern subjects can and do subvert the conditions of their own subjectivity.
In the later volumes of The History of Sexuality, for example, the individual is increasingly positioned as the personal space where both active and passive, and regulated and resistant possibilities for human agency surface in the context of material practices (Katz, 2001) . The self-subjectivation practices, or "technologies of the self" as Foucault calls them, take on a more active, used dimension, less geared to relations of power and discourse, more geared to bending force back on itself and so to self's work on the self. One can begin to read Haraway's (1991) cyborg manifesto, "I would rather be a cyborg than a goddess" (p. 90), into the direction Foucault's work was taking.
Third, Deleuze (1995) stresses that Foucault was one of the first to say that we have been shifting from disciplinary societies to what Deleuze calls control societies. These no longer operate by, for example, physically confining people but through continuous control and instant communication enabled by developments in material technology. In this rendering, what has been called information society can also be read as control society. If this is correct, then Foucault's power/knowledge, discourse, biopower, and governmentality remain as thoroughly applicable concepts, as Foucault intended them. Moreover, Deleuze points out that if each kind of society corresponds to a particular machine (e.g., simple mechanical machines for sovereign societies, thermo-dynamic machines for disciplinary societies, and cybernetic machines and computers for control societies), then: "The machines don't explain anything, you have to analyze the collective arrangements of which the machines are just one component" (p. 175). In other words, the machines do not determine different kinds of society but do express the social forms capable of producing them and making use of them. And of course, as we argue later, the shift to new forms of society can be exaggerated, as we have seen in the rhetorics of postmodernism and on the Internet and in digital and knowledge economies.
Foucault-"Ghost" in the Automate-Informate Debate
Although Foucault never wrote explicitly about ICTs, one book he might have written on the subject is, ironically, given the relative neglect of Foucault's work in the area, the most cited and celebrated in the whole of the IS field, namely Zuboff's (1988) book, In the Age of the Smart Machine. The most cited aspect of Zuboff is its major premise. ICTs can be designed and applied to automate or informate work. The former option builds on ICT potential for speed and consistency but creates deskilled blue-and white-collar jobs, minimizes job satisfaction, can displace physical labor, and increases the decision making, discretion, and remoteness of management. Informating, on the other hand, derives from the enormous transparency given by ICT-assisted information generated from an organization's underlying production and administrative processes. Informating enables much greater ICT potential to be exploited and more commercial advantage to be gained.
Undoubtedly, changes in technology greatly increase what is possible. But, Zuboff argues, what subsequently happens depends on transformations, profound discontinuities in fact, in how knowledge, authority, and technique are managed and implies a comprehensive, conscious strategy. The dilemma is posed by Zuboff as a stark and ultimately political question. Will managers move from drivers of largely bodily labor to drivers of learning? Do and will managers utilize ICT to support, and even reinforce, existing political, social, and organizational structures and processes or transform these and their own positions within them to gain the full payoffs from ICT investments?
In all this, though not heavily referenced, the influence of Foucault is quite striking. Zuboff's concept of power is not exactly that of Foucault's, but, for her, power is a key concept, does circulate, and is intimately related to skills and types of knowledge. Like Foucault, she downplays conspiracy and instead stresses contingency and expediency in how things turn out. Her approach in taking a long-run historical perspective on the laboring body and skill in production and white-collar work, on managerial authority (called by her "the spiritual dimension of power"), and in presenting ICT as a potential discontinuityall these echo the shape of Foucault's work in many places. In many ways, Zuboff maps a long-run, complex, Foucault-like discourse on management, work, technology, and struggles, into which ICTs are finding their way.
Foucault is also influential in Zuboff's concentration on technique, which she calls the material dimension of power. The debt then becomes explicit in the related two chapter headings, namely, "The Information Panopticon" and "Panoptic Power and The Social Text." Her focus on biopower and the microphysics of power-how power produces bodies and minds-is also the Foucault of Discipline and Punish. Interestingly here, in her excellent research methodology, she gives a central place to phenomenology-a move Foucault would have needed to make if he had wanted to explore biopower further at the material level in institutional settings. The automate-informate dilemma is also one that points, Foucauldian-like, to "the present danger": Will we reinforce present disciplinary, panoptic tendencies through ICT applications, or will we take up other options the new boost in power and possibilities these technologies can offer? Ultimately, the pessimism in her findings, and to some extent her conclusions, also remind one of Foucault's own dilemmas with disciplinary or biopower.
But something interesting then happens to the direction which the informate-automate debate takes. As Zuboff's book becomes a bestseller, its Foucauldian influences and themes fall away almost completely, and the automate-informate dilemma comes to be posed as a choice for managers and indeed capitalist societies to make. Partly, this is because how the book is sold, with a simplified central message, an "informate" challenge, indeed that Zuboff asks managers to step up to in her last chapter. But interestingly, there is some inconsistency between, on the one hand, the rich historical discourse and constraints she describes, and, on the other, the levels of active choice she then assumes for managers.
In practice, Zuboff's work becomes adopted by the Harvard Business School where she was, at the time, an associate professor. Harnessing the school's reputational effects and its powerful marketing and self-referencing capability, the book's public messages are pushed into certain directions rather than others. In fact, arguably, the book is used to support Harvard's own "can do," "born again" transformative philosophy of management, in which a dichotomous before-after, from-to message is transmitted to trainee managers and businesses alike. Simple, powerful messages are likely to be more influential than the twists and turns of a long, rich, and complex book that most have probably read about rather than read all the way through. Power/knowledge circulates; people, institutions, and documents are its relays; knowledge and power produce each other indeed.
Ultimately, the meaning of Zuboff's book is diluted and rendered complementary to, for example, Walton (1989) , also a product of Harvard. Walton's work goes on to figure prominently in another book highly influential in IS, namely the Corporation of the 1990s (Scott Morton, 1991) . This proceeds to offer dichotomous thinking in contrasting bad-good "control" versus "commitment" strategies in ICT use and, in an un-Foucauldian manner, fails to problematize commitment strategies and their political and control implications. A more informed view here is provided by Deetz (1998) and Townley (1993) , who see the cultural or normative controls that operate as alternatives to bureaucratic rules and direct supervision as new technologies of power developed within knowledge-intensive organizations.
A related, influential development has been the neo-Zuboffian "don't automate, obliterate" message of Hammer and Champy's writings on re-engineering the corporation, with heavy use of ICTs. Grint and Willcocks (1995) point out that Hammer and Champy work with a negative, unitary view of power, and although the objective of re-engineering is ostensibly to render the corporation apolitical, in fact successful re-engineering, supported by labor "empowerment" strategies, is designed to make managerial power and control more complete. The inherently political agenda is signalled by the marked violence in the language used, the dismissal of "resistance to change," the determination to banish social, cultural, and historical issues by starting with a blank sheet of paper, the use of managementdetermined ICT designs to support the shape and process of the transformed corporation. On this view, informate is too small a step and "transformate" is necessary (see also Scott Morton, 1991), but only a more radical view of power relations would seek to fully problematize the intentions, approaches, and outcomes. Those in IS studying such phenomena could more than usefully adopt Foucauldian concepts and modes of analysis.
Foucault and Disciplining IS
Ironically, again, the Foucauldian elements of Zuboff's book have been remarkably uninfluential in IS, a relatively immature discipline crying out for applicable theory. But Zuboff's influence, taught as she is on every conceivable type of IS programme, has hardly stretched to the founding of a Foucauldian school of IS. Despite her demonstration of his applicability, why not Foucault now?
The operational word here may will be discipline. For decades, a string of scholars and articles have registered "discipline anxiety" for IS. This comes from its relative newness as an area of study and its hybridity, based as it is on an amalgamation of computer science, operational research, management studies, economics, organization studies, and strategic management, to name a few. The definitional phrase that comes to mind is the one Richard Whitley used for management studies: a fragmented adhocracy. How to discipline and gain intellectual respectability for a knowledge field lacking discipline?
A natural tendency is look to another accepted reference discipline for already approved methods, procedures, and standards, for definitions of what qualifies as knowledge and truth. One unfortunate outcome in IS is that methods and approaches have often been adopted uncritically (i.e., failing to address the debates that surround them in their own discipline; e.g., transaction cost theory in economics) or may be inappropriate for the specific research task. This can lead to unnecessary defensive polarities developing and an overexpectation on what a particular approach can deliver.
For historical reasons-not least because of the hard technology component of IS, the general dominance of the procedures of the natural sciences infiltrating into the social sciences, Willcocks / Michel Foucault in the Social Study of ICTs 279 the large influence of North American academic practices in IS-the IS tendency has been to focus on quantitative, statistics-based methods and procedures derived from natural sciences. The rise of IS as a discipline has yet to be charted satisfactorily and may well benefit from a Foucauldian analysis. IS awaits its genealogist, though Introna (2001) makes a thoughtprovoking start in his paper on evolving regimes of truth from 1977 to 2000 at one of the major IS journals, namely MIS Quarterly. He shows the mechanisms used to produce truth and how contingent they were and how, through intentional and unintentional moves, these regimes of truth were continually shifting, opening spaces for certain types of research to become legitimate and others not. It is a matter of some pertinence here that the widespread acceptance of certain types of qualitative, interpretative, and case research into major IS journals has been a relatively recent phenomenon. In such an unstable situation, given their cross-disciplinarity and provisional methods, Foucauldian-type studies, at best, could only be marginal to how the IS discipline has been developing.
The debate on what would constitute IS as a discipline has been running for some time. Post-2000, faced with the sheer rising diversity in research methods being adopted in the field, there has been renewed discipline anxiety and fresh debates in several major IS journals over establishing the rules and procedures for what counts as knowledge and how it can be legitimately produced. Introna (2003) makes an interesting Foucauldian intervention in pointing out that what constitutes acceptable research methods, processes for producing the truth, and a definable knowledge base are not matters of what is right or rationally superior, but these are inherently political questions from the start. Moreover, participants are not just disciplining others in the process of creating the IS discipline but are also disciplining themselves. Introna also points out that if IS proceeds to constitute itself as a regime of truth, then it will need to follow Foucault (in Gordon, 1980) in establishing five things. These are On these counts, one would suggest that if IS is not yet externally or even self-regarded as a discipline, that it has been remarkably successful at disciplining itself, and that this process deserves much more detailed, perhaps Foucauldian study.
Assessing Foucault's Use in IS Studies
Having said all this, some within IS have made a strong case for Foucault and indeed have used aspects of his work. Introna (1997) effectively utilizes Foucault's power/knowledge in harness with Clegg's (1989) conceptualization of circuits of power to explicate several case studies of ICT implementation and use. Brooke (2002a Brooke ( , 2002b , in discussing what it means to be "critical" in IS research, argues that Foucault can be used to move beyond the Habermasian framework employed in earlier IS work. As a related point, initially Habermas was presented somewhat uncritically in IS, but there has grown up a healthy critique of his 280 Social Science Computer Review use that Foucault's work can readily fuel (Klein & Hunyh, 2004) . Indeed, Foucault challenges an idea central to critical theory when he suggests that relations of power are not something bad in themselves, nor something from which one can or must be emancipated. Foucault also argues that any production of knowledge contains within itself the potential for contradictory outcomes. If this is useful, then the scientific and positivistic heritage of IS does tend to favor adoption of approaches that are more easily "modeled," and any line of research seeking to use a normatively articulated framework will tend to favor a Habermasian approach rather than a Foucauldian one. But when it comes to applying critical theory, who guards the guards? From a Foucauldian perspective, it is not enough to apply particular methodological frameworks; we also have to subject them to on-going critique, and Foucault's work supplies means for doing this.
Davies has also sought to apply Foucault in several pieces of empirical research. For example, Davies and Mitchell (1994) adopted a research perspective that sought to understand technology formation as a power/knowledge object used within a sociopolitical context, but also looking at how technological forms affect the predomination of discourse of power, allowing for the "truth" of an object's utility value to emerge as a product of its own structural form and the value of the form according to the group world-view adopting it. (pp. 108-122) The authors argue, with Burrell (1998) , that Foucault's genealogical method, focus on history, and concept of power/knowledge are of high relevance to studying organizational forms currently emerging, particularly in relation to the control of information effects induced by the increasing reliance on information technologies within organizations.
Although Davies and Mitchell do not adopt Foucault as comprehensively as they might, they do demonstrate how his work on the regulatory nature of discourse within contextual histories can be used productively in IS studies, in this case that of IT manipulation in an Australian state government department. Following Foucault, they point to the constraining regulations by which discourse is inevitably tied. They take three interacting forms, shown in Figure 1 .
The three principles of exclusion are immediately external to a discourse and define and legitimize meaning and rationality within discourse. The three principles of limitation operate to classify order and distribute the discourse to allow for and to deal with irruption and unpredictability. Finally, the three principles of communication create the ritual framework (akin to an ideology) of the context of any discourse, with the ritual framework being more dominating than the merely external principles.
Although these constructs may seem somewhat abstracted, the researchers do bring them to life in applying them to a concrete case, namely the purchasing of office support systems. By applying all the concepts, the research shows how one system is adopted in preference to another, predominantly through the prior regulations of discourse supporting the continuance of the superior technical knowledge and power of the IT function. The researchers successfully show how applying Foucauldian principles to analyzing the discursive context of IT use in an organization can provide in-depth insight into the role of power and politics and whether IT is used augmentatively, to reinforce the status quo, or transformatively.
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A later Foucauldian study of an ICT needs analysis project was also carried out by Davies, as Harvey (1998) . The study usefully demonstrates how the history of power relations in an IT decision context influenced discourses regarding the acceptability of solutions. Historical dominance was demonstrated through how visibility was controlled, how counter-discourses were silenced, and how surveillance was applied. What is interesting in this study, and those of Davies and Mitchell (1994) and of Zuboff (1988) , is how they all extend and enhance interpretive research methods through using Foucault. Indeed, though interpetivism was never a direction in which Foucault himself was heading, Doolin (1998) argues that this is a necessary move to counter potential shortcomings in the treatment of technology in interpretive research on IS.
For our purposes, Doolin (1998) is more useful in illustrating this theme of IS as a calculative and disciplinary technology. He does so by reference to his own Foucauldian study of power relations and effects involving the deployment of a hospital "casemix" IS. A case mix system is an IS that links detailed information on individual patient clinical activity with associated costs, for use by managers and service providers as a basis for contracting and for revealing the relative efficiency of clinical resource usage. The intention is to place clinical activity under scrutiny and to persuade clinicians to conform to "normal" work practices. Potentially, Doolin found that the IS could increase hospital management control directly and indirectly. 
Societies of Discourse Social Appropriation

Systems of Regulation and Control
Taboos
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Meaning rules maintained
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Source: Davies and Mitchell (1994) .
Figure 1 Principles of Discourse Regulation (After Foucault)
make stronger truth claims in their attempts to contain clinical resource usage. Surveillance through the system also had the potential to engender a degree of self-control in clinicians' behavior, leading to rational decision making and more efficient usage of resources.
However, following Foucault, resistance by the clinicians was always possible. Disciplinary technologies such as comparative surveillance IS are not exclusively constraining but instead open up a new discursive space for action. In practice, clinicians often appropriated and manipulated the information and rhetoric of the system, diverting disciplinary practices to their own ends, principally in arguing for more resources. Indeed, some senior clinicians explored the possibilities offered by the casemix system in assuming new roles as clinician managers. However, the IS increased the transparency of professional knowledge, expertise, and work processes. Its deployment provided management with the technology and the rational justification for increased intervention in medical practice. Moreover, casemix information became the currency of debate, the principal media through which claims to legitimacy and control were processed. Taking a Foucualdian view, Doolin points out that in reproducing the practices associated with the casemix IS, clinicians internalized the norms and values inherent in the particular discourse in which casemix is grounded, opening up the possibility of their self-control as self-disciplined subjects. Thus, IS utilization could have more subtle power effects than deliberate strategies to modify clinical behavior through strengthening general management in or imposing computerized surveillance.
These illustrative studies demonstrate how Foucault's work can be utilized creatively and productively in the IS field. Indeed, IS as a discipline may learn a great deal more on the applicability of Foucault if it addresses more seriously the altogether more developed debate and application of his work to be found in organization studies and associated areas (OS/MS).
Foucault and ICTs in Organization and Management Studies
Foucault has had a long-standing presence in sociology and OS/MS because his concepts and contribution have such clear applicability to researching work organizations. Moreover, from the early 1980s as ICTs became increasingly used in organizations, it became a necessary move to embrace the analysis of how they are utilized and embedded in the social bodies, practices, and institutional arrangements of organizations. The same argument can be made from the perspective of IS studies, of course, but, one suspects, its engineering or computer science origins led to a greater focus on the technology artefact. Discipline anxiety led to the adoption of more scientistic and "rigorous" reference disciplines, and those rising to powerful positions in the IS field tended not to espouse approaches, especially unsystematic ones, in which they themselves had not been trained.
The maturity of OS/MS Foucauldian debate and use is well demonstrated in the articles collected by McKinlay and Starkey (1998) and Carter, McKinlay, and Rowlinson (2000) . These carry penetrating papers that seek to critique, develop, and utilize Foucault's work in, for example, human resource management (see also Townley, 1993) , power and politics in organizations and production, managing managers, accounting, reading organizational analysis into Foucault, developing a Foucauldian historical dimension in the study of organizations, Willcocks / Michel Foucault in the Social Study of ICTs 283 the relationships between discipline and desire, the epistemic nature of management, and the need to deconstruct management studies underpinned, like influencing disciplines, as it is by rationality, agency, and causality.
Foucault has also done much to breathe new life into labor process theory, not least in OS/MS researchers emphasizing how individual subjectivities and identities are constructed and reconstructed through discourses operating in the workplace (Knights, 1990; Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994) There has also been an expansion of the concept of power (Clegg, 1989 (Clegg, , 1998 , with Hardy and Leiba-O'Sullivan (1998) positioning Foucault as providing the fourth dimension of power, extending the three defined by Steven Lukes. All this illustrates a strong Foucauldian pedigree in OS/MS, and one that is directly applicable to any work in IS where ICTs are studied in organizational contexts.
Even more pertinent to our purposes is the OS/MS-accumulated evidence gained from applying Foucault to the study of ICTs. Many of these attempts focus on new managerial technologies aimed to broaden the scope and deepen the intensity of the managerial gaze but, Foucault-like, invariably with complex, often unanticipated outcomes. Surveillance, control, and legitimation are facilitated by giving complex, ambiguous phenomena "hard" numerical values (Morgan & Willmott, 1993) , for example, in ICT use in activity-based costing systems where the managerial gaze extends into supplier networks and market information. ICTs facilitate enumeration, which can underpin categorization and thus what is made visible. Such technologies privilege formal quantitative information, aiding in the construction of calculative realities (Bloomfield & Coombs, 1992) .
However, developments in ICTs to monitor and scrutinize can also facilitate panopticonlike control, making individuals within an organization both calculable and calculating with respect to their own actions. For example, Sewell and Wilkinson (1992) investigate these propensities in the context of just in time (JIT) manufacturing and total quality control regimes. They point to the development to what K. Webster and Robins (1993) call "a panopticon without walls," where responsibility can become delegated to groups but individuals become enlisted in their own control through their belief that they are subject to constant electronic surveillance through collected, retained, and disseminated information. McKinley and Starkey (1998) also point to how the extension of JIT supplier relationships accelerates the concentration and widens the scope and speed of corporate knowledge acquisition and that this is knowledge combined with economic power that is not reciprocal: "There is no parallel gaze by consumers or supplier companies into the internal transaction costs of the organization" (p. 10). K. Webster and Robins (1993) suggest also that these developments are not restricted to the labor process or the factory but are more societal, to the point where one can speak of a more generalized "social Taylorism" made more possible through ICTs.
Bloomfield, Knights, Wilmott, and colleagues have done much important work in developing Foucauldian studies of ICTs and organization. It is not possible to do justice to the richness of their work, but good examples can be found in Knights, Murray, and Willmott (1997) , Bloomfield et al. (1997) , and Bloomfield and Coombs (1992) . A particularly representative work is that of Knights and Murray (1994) . This book has the great merit in providing a real, in-depth, theoretical and empirical examination of the politics of systems development. In the theory sections, it provides a Foucauldian-informed critique of the major theoretical perspectives on ICT development and implementation. From this, Knights and Murray then develop a political processual model of organizational change. At its center stands politics as Foucauldian power/knowledge relations enacted in specific conditions of possibility, the social construction of which is also part of an organization's political processes. Knights and Murray (1994) also supply the useful definition of ICT Foucault never provided (see above) to inform their Foucauldian analysis. They see ICT as a set of human and nonhuman artefacts, processes, and practices ordinarily directed toward modifying or transforming natural and social phenomena in pursuit of human purposes. This involves
• Technological artefacts, such as computers, hardware • Technological knowledge, particularly systems development skills • Technological workers and managers engaged in particular systems development and IS specialists • The culture of technology-signs, symbols, and values brought to bear in discussing, using, and developing technology
In this analytical framework, the organization is likened to a pinball machine. While recognizing the limitations of the analogy, the researchers suggest that the political process stands in the middle of the machine and is bombarded by steel balls energized in different parts of the organization. These bounce against the motor of political process and are shot back to bounce against other conditions of the organization. Though a little uncritical of Foucault, as opposed to every other theoretical approach, Knights and Murray (1994) do provide, as they show in their case study, operationalizable analytical tools that can be very useful to ICT researchers.
Foucault, ICTs, and Surveillance
Perhaps the most obvious and influential use of Foucault has been in surveillance studies, not just in manufacturing and service work organizations but across society at large, including in all manner of institutional settings. There is a large literature on the theme of ICT roles in surveillance, with Lyon (1988) and Dandeker (1990) being representative of a number of writers in the late 1980s discussing the "electronic panopticon," the "carceral computer," and "the electronic eye." Poster (1984) is also influenced enough by Foucault to posit an emerging "mode of information" by whose social conduits and databases members of developed economies are organized and controlled.
F. Webster (2005) also links surveillance technologies with the nation-state's "governmentality" role over security needs, rights, and duties of its citizens. For him, the panopticon is not an exact metaphor. Following Giddens, a lot of surveillance information does feed back to people and allow them to reflexively monitor their own position, prospects, and lifestyles. He is drawn instead to De Landa's (1991) depiction of the "machine vision" of military surveillance, where power and the accumulation of information are intimately connected, manifested in things such as telecommunications interceptions, satellite observations, and automatic intelligence. De Landa sees the military dream of machine vision as an extension of earlier panoptic techniques. Now humans and their eyes do not have to Willcocks / Michel Foucault in the Social Study of ICTs 285 physically operate in the surveillance tower. Moreover, surveillance has extended from the optical to the nonoptical regions of the electromagnetic spectrum. Not just computing and telecommunications but the discovery of infrared and ultraviolet radiation, radar, and radio and microwave technology have opened new resources to be exploited and new zones to be policed. De Landa offers the word panspectron to communicate the ambition of total surveyability vested in the "new non-optical intelligence-acquisition machine" (p. 205). This is a highly pertinent issue, not least for IS studies, if De Landa is correct in suggesting that, historically, earlier technologies developed in the military have been transmitted through a series of relays to the civilian worlds. Lyon (1988) registers related concerns in his early work on the rise of information society. He suggests that dreams of electronic democracy must be tempered with a recognition of technological and political realities. He recognizes, even for the late 1980s, that the "carceral computer" is "a present reality, both in direct state administration and control, and in the potential for linkage with private databases" (p. 86). However, as yet the dangers had not been sufficiently recognized or resisted by citizens, and some predictions of total social control by computers may be ahistorical "in that past technological dystopias have not come into being, and may also be based on inadequate social theories" (p. 88).
If Lyon (1988) points to the "present danger," then the subsequent direction much of his work takes suggests that in his estimation, with rising use of ICT, the danger has become very real. Thus, a Lyon (1994) work is entitled The Electronic Eye: the Rise of Surveillance Society. For him, the most socially pervasive question raised by the new technologies has become the garnering of personal information to be stored, matched, retrieved, processed, marketed, and circulated using powerful computer databases and related technologies. His position is that the electronic eye may well blink benignly, but important questions must be asked about under what circumstances and by what criteria the current computer-aided surveillance capability may also become undemocratic, coercive, impersonal, even inhuman.
In later work and edited volumes, Lyon and colleagues provide rich detailed studies of these and related questions (e.g., Lyon, 2003; Lyon & Zureik, 1996) . In all this, it becomes difficult not to read the influence and relevance of Foucault's work, among others. Thus, in these volumes some take the phenomenon of electronic surveillance as contributing to a postmodern condition in which several "virtual selves" circulate within networked databases, independent of their Cartesian counterparts who use credit cards and are identified by social insurance numbers (Lyon & Zureik, 1996) . This raises questions of how identity and selves are constructed, sorted, and controlled, privately and publicly. In the same volume, Mowshowitz sees the widespread use of databases promoting "endogenous" forms of social control, where virtual individuality, group conformity, and other-directedness will reside in the data themselves. For Poster, databases have become the new text in Foucault's sense of discourse.
In all this, researchers point also to limitations in both Foucault's work and in applying it to surveillance studies. Thus, Gandy, writing on "Coming To Terms With the Panoptic Sort" enlists also Giddens's synthesis of Marxian, Weberian, and Foucauldian theory to emphasize surveillance as a modern institution and the role of the "dialectic of control" and knowledgeable human agents in all surveillance situations (Lyon & Zureik, 1996) . Zureik (in Lyon, 2003) concludes that surveillance in the workplace is ubiquitous and increasingly based on network control technologies. He suggests that the concept of panoptic power is important but that more than one theoretical perspective is needed to analyze how in specific contexts empowerment and disempowerment, skilling and deskilling, control and autonomy exist and indeed can coexist, depending on technological deployment, gender, and authority structures (see also Knights & Murray above) . Lyon (1993) asks: In what ways does electronic surveillance display panoptic features? He finds plenty of evidence of ICT being used to accumulate coded information for the internal pacification of nation-states and for panoptic control within workplaces, including what Zuboff calls "anticipatory conformity," where standards of management had been internalized by employees. He also cites evidence of the spillover of panoptic surveillance into society at large in the establishment of, for example, more "efficient" network marketplaces, something that Poster (1990) refers to as a "superpanopticon" because the panoptic has few technical limitations.
But, partly following Giddens, Lyon also sees analysts of electronic surveillance picking up from Foucault a relatively undifferentiated view of power and panopticism and therefore of panopticism's ICT-facilitated spread across different types of institutions. At the same time, he concedes that the reality of contemporary electronic surveillance is that, increasingly, disciplinary networks do, for example, connect employment with civil status or consumption with policing. But if Poster's superpanopticon is accurate, does it nevertheless impose Foucault-type norms, incorporate biopower, discipline subjects? Maybe, Lyon suggests, all it can do is provide a structure, one within which real choices are still made. Ultimately, Lyon finds the panopticon wanting as an explanatory concept. Electronic surveillance does contribute to social control via invisible inspection and categorization. But seeing the panopticon in a "totalizing" way deflects attention form other modes of social ordering (Lyon, 2003) . Lyon (1993) also comments that Foucault's failure to admit any basis of "outrage" against the panopticon inhibits the development of a properly critical theory of electronic surveillance.
Maybe one of the mistakes in contemporary surveillance theory, as in other disciplines, is to represent Foucault's work too one-sidedly by the panopticon and its admittedly strong metaphorical power. As we have seen, Foucault is much richer than this. For example, in summarizing his own work, Foucault defined four major types of technologies, each a matrix of practical reason, each associated with a certain type of domination (Deetz, 1998) . Foucault presents technologies of production, of sign systems, of power, and of self. He also suggests that these may interplay in particular sites. He also worked with a generic mode of discipline, of which the panoptic represents merely one type. One way forward for electronic surveillance studies may well be to readdress Foucault's work more fully. In addition, Dandeker (1990) suggests that, given the uneasy relations in Foucault among an idealist history of knowledge, class struggle, and the functional or technical imperatives of modern societies, his insights may be used to complement those generated by other, especially Weberian, strands of social theory.
From Mode of Information to Network Society and Cyberstudies
In this final section, we look briefly at Foucault's abiding relevance in the face of developments of ICTs and their uses into the 21st century. Poster (1984 Poster ( , 1990 Poster ( , 1995 was among Willcocks / Michel Foucault in the Social Study of ICTs 287 the first to suggest that Foucault provides key ideas (on signification, power/knowledge, subjectification, discourse) for the development of a critical theory of the newly emerging "mode of information." Poster suggests that the reversal of priorities Marx saw in the factory whereby the dead (machines) dominate the living (workers) is being increasingly extended by the computer to the realm of knowledge. He usefully posits three stages in the mode of information:
• Face-to-face, orally mediated exchange, characterized by symbolic correspondences • Written exchanges mediated by print, characterized by the representation of signs • Electronically mediated exchange, characterized by informational simulations Given the attributes and applications of ICT, an increasing, distinctive characteristic in the latter electronic stage is that the self becomes decentered, dispersed, and multiplied in continuous instability. If Poster (1990) subsequently utilizes several postmodernist thinkers to analyze the emerging mode of information, he finds how information is structured and used through databases and their relation to society best disclosed by Foucault's analysis of discourse: "The linguistic quality of the database, its implications for politics, can best be captured by a theory, like Foucault's, that problematizes the interdependence of language and action" (p. 97). As we have seen, Poster sees electronic circuits of communication and the databases they generate constituting a superpanopticon, a system of surveillance without walls, windows, towers, or guards.
New ICTs used in surveillance result in a qualitative change in the microphysics of power. However, he observes, technological change is only part of the process. The populace, through social security cards and driver's licenses and in their consumerist activities, for example, have been disciplined to surveillance and participating in the process. For Poster (1990 Poster ( , 1995 , when Foucauldian discourse analysis is applied to the new mode of information, it yields the uncomfortable discovery that the populace participates in its own self-constitution as subjects of the normalizing gaze of the superpanopticon. Moreover, databases are seen often not as a threat to a centered individual or a threat to privacy but as the multiplication of the individual, the constitution of an additional self, and that may be acted on to the detriment of the "real" self without that "real" self ever being aware of what is happening. For Poster, then, while recognizing the deficiencies of Foucault's work, the concepts and methods for exploring discourse, subjectification, disciplining, knowledge, and power relations remain key to critical study of ICTs and indeed the Internet (Poster, 2001) in the emerging mode of information they facilitate. Although the genealogy of information and communications technologies has yet to be written, Foucault, as Poster (1990) recognizes, provides a considerable amount of the groundwork needed.
Munro (2000) also recognizes how Foucault has been drawn on to analyze the power relations involved in computer IS. As a partial corrective, he argues not that disciplinary modalities of power have disappeared but that they are subject to infiltration and mutation where ICTs are transforming social relationships and allowing other forms of power to be brought to bear. The examples he includes are how the human genome project is bringing to bear biotechnologies such as genetic screening and cloning. He also cites Deleuze's (1995) depiction of moves toward a "control" society (e.g., from schools to continuing education, from prisons to electronic tagging). Also, new forms of "resistance" are possible (e.g., computer piracy and viruses, sabotage of information databases). Also, new social divisions are developing, including the information haves and have-nots. Also, new institutions are developing, consisting of series of connected nodes or stations that work by circulating information flows and wealth and goods. He points to the power of networks and how these new institutions do not rely on enclosure or visual surveillance. Instead, power operates through the regulation of flows rather than the imposition of exercises (Deleuze, 1995) .
Munro posits the rise of network power in contrast to panoptic power. The differentiation he makes is along the dimensions of techniques, space, time, and the body (Figure 2) . At the level of technique, power relations become more centered on access to and control over information and the electronic text. Time-space constraints disappear, with real time and connected nodes creating new circuits of power. Following Virilio, the body becomes motile, that is, more dependent on communications prosthetics (e.g., mobile phone, portable computer). Although the docile body was the object of disciplinary power, the prosthetic body is the object of network power.
Munro argues that sticking doggedly to Foucault's original conceptualizations of disciplinary power can lead to errors in analysis in these new conditions. Bauman (1991 Bauman ( , 1999 also recognizes Foucault as seminal in the study of disciplinary societies and their technologies but posits less relevance for control technologies in the changed conditions of liquid modernity. However, although Bauman argues that seduction tends to replaces panoptic forms of control, he does posit that large parts of the population still require close control. Moreover, Bauman and Munro probably underestimate the extent to which the new ICTs themselves are conditioned in the first place and may subsequently be infiltrated by disciplinary power (Finlay, 1987a (Finlay, , 1987b ). Munro's is a good formulation but is over-dichotomous in its presentation of developments. And as with computer surveillance studies, his argument also relies on not granting to Foucauldian analysis the full richness of Foucault's ideas and formulations.
In contrast, in documenting what they call "changes in the technoscape," Robins and Webster (1999) argue that the information revolution does not represent a profound break from the past but a continuation of capitalism in many similar forms. Moreover, the prevailing virtual culture "lacks critical edge with respect to the capitalist dynamics of the network society" (p. 126; see also Feenberg, 2002) . If this is the case, then not only is Foucault not outdated, as some have suggested, but means of critical questioning such as he provides are vitally needed in the study of contemporary ICTs. In looking at contemporary developments, one can trace Foucault's influence into work on biopower and technology. Best and Kellner (2001) argue otherwise and point out that although Foucault (1966 Foucault ( /1970 heralded the "death of man" and the coming of posthumanism, he saw this as a merely conceptual transformation from one episteme to another, whereas the shift to posthumanism is also a material matter of new technologies erasing the boundaries between biology and technology. They argue that Foucault provides no analysis of information and communications technologies and little consideration of the hybrid landscape of technobodies. However, Best and Kellner have to concede that Foucault considers both the enmeshment of the body in systems of discipline and surveillance and ethical technologies of the self that cultivate "new passions and new pleasures." Hayles (1999) rightly points out that the absorption of embodiment into discourse imparted interpretive power to Foucault, but he also limited his analysis in significant ways. The universalization of the Foucauldian body is a direct result of concentrating on discourse rather than embodiment. Building on Foucault's work while going beyond it requires understanding how embodiment moves in conjunction with inscription, technology, and ideology. But, as we have seen, this is something that Zuboff's work largely achieves, whereas Sofoulis (2002) rightly points out Foucault's influence on Haraway (1991) and her subsequent development of his notions of biopower and biopolitics in her post-Foucauldian notions of the "informatics of domination" and "techno-biopower." Quinby (1999) has also reorientated Foucault's work on subject formation. She uses it to develop how "technoppression" can occur in the pursuit of the programmed perfection enabled by digital and biotechnologies. A Foucauldian perspective is useful in questioning the race to human bodily perfection through technological means.
Finally, one can point to some interest in Foucault's work among those studying the Internet. The questioning here is whether the Internet and cyberspace is or will become a form of more intensive control and power relations-precisely Foucault's concern registered at the head of this chapter. The literature so far tends to have different interests and emphases. Three examples need suffice. Thus, Aycock (1997) is interested in applying the later Foucault and his notions of technologies of the self to examine how online identities can be fashioned. Winokur (2003) applies yet again the concept of the panopticon and concludes that the codes of cyberspace are not clearly a disciplinary discourse. Boyle (1997) is interested in legal issues, surveillance, levels of censorship, and the development of digital libertarianism. He argues that digital libertarianism is often blind to the effects of private power but also the state's own power in cyberspace. In practice, he finds that the state can often use privatized enforcement and statebacked technologies to evade some of the supposed practical and constitutional restraints on the exercise of legal power over the Net. He also argues that technical solutions to these dilemmas are neither as neutral nor as benign as they are often perceived to be.
Conclusion
In providing a critical review, this article has argued for the abiding relevance of Foucault's work and the usefulness of incorporating and developing further his thinking into contemporary studies of ICTs. This should be done as a critical act in three senses. First, Foucault should not be applied uncritically. Following Barratt (2003) , he should be worked with rather than copied. This article accepts the provisional, unfinished nature of 290 Social Science Computer Review
